

## Logical social similarities and imitation (Phenomenon influencing human thinking)

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**Abstract:** The problem of logical social similarity and imitation has been studied very little by the humanities. Logical social similarities and imitation are important areas of thought and socio-cultural development. By separating the social aspects of man from the biological and physical, one can find that there are an extraordinary number of analogies between them. This area, which is of greatest interest to logic, psychoanalysis, and social psychology, once again confirms the need for a more in-depth study of analogy—one of the forms of inference studied at the rational level of cognition. The fact that imitated social phenomena have deep and very natural analogies with physical and biological phenomena necessitates their broader study. The research work "Logical Social Similarities and Imitation" is one of the most important problems in philosophy, logic, and fiction. At the beginning of the scientific research, the relevance of the topic was analyzed, as well as the works and views of philosophers on this problem in the history of philosophy. Furthermore, logical similarities and imitation, laws of imitation, logical duels, non-logical effects, imitation from internal to external, language, legislation, customs, requirements, etc., related to imitation are considered in detail. It is noted that as a continuation of scientific research, it is necessary to study the logical laws of imitation more fully and independently.

**Keywords:** *History of philosophy, Imitation, Imitation, Laws of imitation, Logic and fiction, Logical duels, Logical similarities, Logical social similarities.*

### 1. Introduction

The problem of logical social similarity and imitation has also been studied in great detail in the history of philosophical thought. This problem occupied an important place in the thinking of ancient philosophers. This problem has been widely discussed in such areas as philosophy, logic, aesthetics and fiction. The views of ancient philosophers can be interpreted as follows.

The ideas of the ancient Greek philosopher Socrates are quite interesting. Socrates argued that social similarity and imitation often hinder a person's self-awareness [1]. According to Socrates, true wisdom can only be acquired through individual reflection, not mass imitation.

The issue of imitation was also widely discussed in the works of Plato. He criticized art and poetry, emphasizing that imitation leads to a departure from truth. Plato considered the ideal world to be the source of reality and noted that the material world is an imitation of these ideas. According to his theory, people should also imitate the deeply meaningful ideals of society and be guided by moral values.

Aristotle took a different approach to the concept of imitation. In his work *Poetics*, he notes that imitation is a natural process and that man has acquired this ability due to his nature. Aristotle believed that imitation is a means of acquiring knowledge and expanding experience. He argued that people learn through imitation from childhood and that imitation leads to innovations in art and science [2].

The Epicureans, on the other hand, recommended that in order for a person to achieve happiness, he should avoid blind imitation of social norms. They preferred individual freedom and a way of life based on personal experience. The Stoics, on the other hand, considered social harmony and imitation to be actions consistent with human nature. In their view, a certain degree of imitation is necessary for the continuity of society.

Ancient philosophers considered imitation from a logical point of view and explained it in terms of both positive and negative aspects.

Positive aspects: Imitation is part of the process of logical thinking, people acquire knowledge and culture by imitating each other.

Negative aspects: Irrational imitation can lead to loss of activity, moral weakness and distance from the truth.

The ideas of ancient philosophers on this issue form the basis of modern philosophical science and logical cognitive theories. Their analysis is still very relevant in terms of understanding the fundamental mechanisms of interaction between man and society [3].

Logical social similarity is one of the fundamental characteristics of human society and behavior. This concept is related to the fact that individuals and groups adopt similar behavior, thoughts and values. People create common values and rules of behavior by adapting to others in a social environment. Logical social similarity arises through processes such as imitation, adaptation, and social learning.

Social similarity is based on the human need to communicate with others. This creates a sense of social security and also helps to form unity between groups. However, the tendency of individuals to mass imitation can in some cases lead to a decrease in individual thinking and creativity [4].

Philosophers of the 19th and 20th centuries analyzed the concepts of imitation and logical social similarity in various aspects of society. Among them, the French philosopher Gabriel Tarde put forward a systematic theory of imitation and logical social similarity. According to him, imitation is the basis of social dynamics in society. Tarde said: "If people did not imitate each other, the transmission of culture and knowledge would be impossible." He also considered how imitation spreads through mass media and its role in the emergence of innovations in society. We also want to give a more detailed interpretation of the issues related to logical social similarities and imitation, as shown in the theories of the French philosopher J. Tarde, in his work "Laws of Imitation", as follows.

When studying human society, at first glance it seems that there are too many exceptions and objections.

In the first place, between two living species belonging to entirely different phyla there are frequently anatomical or physiological similarities which cannot be accounted for by any apparent hereditary repetition, since in most cases the common ancestor which we regard as the link between the two species never possessed, or could not possess, these distinctive features [5]. The fish-like appearance of the whale was probably not inherited from the hypothetical ancestor which is common to fishes and mammals, and which has served as the origin of these two classes. If the bee resembles the bird in its power of flight, we cannot say with certainty that birds and bees have inherited wings from their ancient ancestors, who were undoubtedly flightless reptiles. The same may be said of the similarity of instincts in animals very distant from each other, as Darwin and Romens have remarked. The similarity here observed can only be explained by the similarity of the physical environment in which these different types of beings seek the means of satisfying the fundamental individual needs which are important and the same for all living beings and for each of them. But what is the identity of this physical environment? Of course, since light, heat and sound waves are distributed uniformly in air and water; air and water, in turn, are composed of atoms which vibrate in the same way [6].

Similarly, two peoples who have created a unique and independent civilization always have common and similar aspects in the field of language, mythology, politics, economics, art or literature, and in this case mutual imitation plays no role. According to Carthage, when Cook visited the New Zealanders, he noticed features strikingly similar to those of the Scots of the time of Rob Roy and McEvoy. Such

similarities between the social organizations of the Maori and the ancient Scottish clans certainly did not arise from any common legendary source; and linguists will never have the satisfaction of proving that their languages are descended from a common ancestor. At the time of Cortes' arrival in Mexico, the American Aztecs, like many European nations, had rulers, nobles, and agricultural and industrial classes; the floating islands of the Aztecs, their agriculture with their perfect system of irrigation, recalled the genies and Egypt with its architectural monuments, painting, and hieroglyphic writings; in spite of their oddities, the Aztec calendars show that their astronomical knowledge of that time was close to ours [7].

In this accidental resemblance and innumerable similarities of this kind, we find, on the one hand, the fundamental unity of human nature, the identity of its organic needs (the satisfaction of which is the chief end of all social evolution), the identity of the parts and structure of the brain; on the other hand, the uniformity of external nature, which satisfies similar and identical needs by almost the same means, and presents to similarly constituted eyes the same picture and spectacle. Would not all this inevitably lead to great similarities in industry, art, myths, and theories? This similarity, like the similarities we have mentioned above, may indeed be traced to the general principle of the occurrence of repetitions in all similarities, but the cause of these social similarities may be biological and physical repetition, the hereditary transmission of the characteristics of the organism which are the state of the human races, and the transmission of oscillatory movements represented in the form of temperature, light rays, electricity, and the chemical similarities which constitute the climate in which man lives and the soil which he cultivates. It must be borne in mind that, on the one hand, the need for inventions and discoveries, like every need, develops in proportion to the degree of its satisfaction, and, on the other hand, every invention can be traced to the fortunate meeting of some imitative current in the thinking brain with another imitative current which strengthens it, or with some sharp external impression which suddenly illuminates the acquired idea, or, finally, with a living sense of natural necessity which finds unexpected help in the usual process.

If we analyze the above impressions and feelings into their component parts, we shall see that they almost entirely fall apart into psychological elements formed under the influence of example, and the higher the civilization, the more complete becomes this division. We see every phenomenon of nature through glasses tinted with the colors of our mother tongue, our national religion, the prevailing ideas, and the highest scientific theory, and no amount of cold-blooded and unnecessary observation can save us from this; every organic need is felt by us in a special way, illuminated by the examples that surround us, and the social environment, creating this need by examples, or, better said, awakening it in us, appropriates it precisely in this way. When, therefore, in our century the first idea arose of using the steam engine, already in use in factories, to satisfy the demand for long voyages, a demand created by all the previous maritime discoveries and their spread, we must see in this brilliant idea one imitation meeting another, as we must see in another which arose later, the idea of attaching a screw to a steamship, for both the screw and the steam engine had long been known [8].

Thus, if we consider all inventions and discoveries as combinations of a certain kind, and if their elements serve, with small superficial additions, to imitate the previous ones, and if these combinations in their turn can become elements of new and more complex systems as objects of imitation, then it follows that there exists a tree of which the ancient philosophers dreamed, a genealogical tree in which successful undertakings are superimposed one on another, and the embryos are intertwined. Every invention is a realized possibility, one of the necessary consequences hidden deep within the first invention, which gave rise to subsequent inventions; an invention that comes into the world makes many of the former possibilities impossible, but it also creates the possibility of many other discoveries that were previously impossible. These latter may or may not predominate among nations already illuminated by this or that light, according to the direction and length of the ray of imitation.

In general, if we wish to explain the social similarity between nations separated from each other by more or less insurmountable obstacles by imitating a first example (of which no memory has been preserved), there is no other way than to find all the possible inventions on this subject among each of

these nations, and often to exclude all useless and less useful ideas [9]. However, this last hypothesis is at odds with the poor imagination of new nations. It is therefore more expedient to adhere to the first theory and not to abandon it without sufficiently convincing reasons. For example, can we be sure that the idea of building a house in a swamp, common among the ancient inhabitants of Switzerland and New Guinea, was not inspired by some imitation? The same question may be asked about the sharpening or polishing of flint, the sewing of fish bones and sinews, and the rubbing of pieces of wood together to make fire. Before we deny the possibility of a slow and gradual spread of these ideas by imitation (which would eventually cover the whole globe), we must first of all remember the infinitely long prehistory, and also consider that we have evidence of contacts over great distances not only between the peoples of the Bronze Age, who had to bring tin from afar, but also between the peoples of the Stone Age and even of the Stone Age. The great conquests which have taken place in all periods must have contributed to the wide diffusion of civilizing ideas, even in prehistoric times, or rather especially in historical times, since the more scattered and backward the enslaved peoples are, the easier it is to effect any great conquest. A striking example of such a period of "deluges" is the Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century, and we know that it led to the destruction of the barriers between the ten "closed peoples" and the establishment of contacts between China and India, and between them and Europe [10].

This a priori conclusion, if we take into account the interrelationship we have established between the three forms of universal repetition, recalls the erroneous ideas previously accepted by the ancient physicists, who saw a transfer of matter in all cases where physical movements are manifested, for example, in the propagation of light or heat. Did not Newton himself believe that the propagation of the sun's rays was due to a stream of light particles thrown off by the sun to infinite distances? My point of view on this matter is as far from the generally accepted point of view as the wave theory of propagation in optics is from the theory of flux. Incidentally, I do not deny the social influence caused or produced by the movement of troops or merchant ships, but I deny that this is the only or even the main way in which civilizations are infected with radiation contagion [11].

This is precisely what must be considered fundamental in history. This movement is so constant, powerful and irresistible that it can reach the "ends of the earth" without weakening in the least, if only it is given enough time. Mankind is more than a hundred thousand years old, so we can say with full justification that in the epoch which we study under the name of antiquity, this movement had already spread throughout the world.

The cause, therefore, of the similarity or difference of all the phenomena presented by human society, not physical or vital, but social phenomena, is imitation. It is not without reason, therefore, that the similarities which are found between the various social phenomena of different societies, and which are independent and not imposed from without, are called natural. If one wishes to look at societies from their independent point of view, one must call their laws, their government, their customs and their crimes - natural law, natural politics, natural industry, natural art, natural crime... It is clear that these similarities are very important; the trouble is that you will waste time trying to define them precisely - the uncertainty and irremediable freedom of their features will eventually repel anyone accustomed to methods and scientific precision.

They might tell us that if imitation is a social phenomenon, the instinctive laziness which is in the highest degree natural is not a social phenomenon at all, but it leads to a tendency to adopt ready-made inventions from others in order to avoid the trouble of inventing. But if this tendency itself necessarily precedes the first social fact, it may vary considerably in strength and direction according to the type of habits which have already formed against imitation. Finally, they might tell us this: these tendencies are only one form of the needs which you consider deep and innate, and by which you explain all the laws of social logic (that is, the need which is in the strongest and firmest conviction) which will ultimately manifest itself. If these laws exist, and their origin is not social at all, then the resemblances which they create in the institutions and ideas of nations have a natural and not a social cause. For example, it is already a striking coincidence that all the uncivilized peoples of America, Africa and Asia explain the disease of madness in the same way (i.e., by the entry of demons into the body of the patient); then, since

such an explanation is assumed, then as a logical consequence there arises the idea, the same in both the New and the Old World, of healing the sick by driving out demons through witchcraft and charms [12].

If it cannot be denied that presocial man had a certain logical orientation, then the need for logical coordination, which was strengthened and determined by the influence of the social environment, underwent here the most bizarre changes and, according to the degree of satisfaction it found there, was strengthened and developed in the same way as everything else. When a work is simultaneously classified as art and industry, then, on the basis of what has been said, it can be expected that, although it resembles works of foreign origin and independently created in the homeland, it will differ from them in its aesthetics. On the whole, this other element seems very insignificant to the positively minded person; but do not statues, vessels, household objects, songs and epic works of different civilizations differ from each other only in these details? Are not all these details, characteristic shades, expressions of speech, this particular color, this style or manner more important for the artist? These are the visible and at the same time profound distinctive features of a given civilization: here the design of a dome, there a pediment, here a roundness and a bizarre form which, without being subordinated to utility, dominates it and in this respect corresponds to the morphological features which masterfully determine the functioning of society, by means of which the types of life are determined. Therefore, aesthetically, that is, from a purely social point of view, one can deny the true similarity of works that differ from one another only in these details [13].

Much has been said among aestheticians about the supposed law of the development of the fine arts, according to which, by virtue of law, the fine arts circulate in the same circle and appear in an indefinite number of new editions. Unfortunately, no one has succeeded in formulating this law without constantly encountering facts that contradict it; The same idea, though in a lesser degree, and this is what must have been the case after all that has gone before, is applicable to the laws of various religions, languages, forms of government, legality, morality, science, as they say. Perrault, who was much involved in the superstitions of our time, was forced to admit in his History of Art that the development of the architectural orders of Egypt and Greece did not pass through analogous phases. It is certain that in both places the stone pillar from the earliest times began to replace the wooden pillar, imitating it more or less faithfully, and for a long time reflected the signs of this skill; at this time both in Egypt and Greece, images of local plants (in the one case, the acanthus, in the other, the lotus or the palm) were used to decorate the capitals of columns.

It is also an indisputable fact that originally the Greek or Egyptian columns were solid and simple along their entire length, and later they were divided into three parts: the capital, the body, and the base. Finally, there is no doubt that the decoration of the capital in Greece and the column in Egypt gradually became more complex and loaded with new ornaments. The first of these three analogies once again shows the basic principle of the instinctive imitation of social man, and the third shows the most important result of this principle - the gradual accumulation of consistent inventions that are preserved and spread by means of a radiating imitation, the center of which is each of them. As for the second principle, this is one of the functional analogies that we have discussed above. In fact, the division of the column into three parts was almost directly dictated by the properties of the materials used and the law of gravity, since safety requirements obliged the construction of buildings of a certain height.

Moreover, here too, significant differences are fully revealed: among the Greeks, "the proportions in the dimensions of the columns always changed in the same way; so that the ratio of the height of the column's body to its diameter gradually increased. Although the Doric columns of the Parthenon are higher than the similar columns of the Corinthian temple, they are lower than the Doric columns of Rome. It was different in Egypt, where for centuries the forms did not tend either to lengthen or to shrink. The sixteen-tone, longitudinally striped column in Bani Hasan is not as dense as the columns that appeared after it." One can even detect traces of a development completely opposed to Hellenism [14].

The author I mentioned above says: "Thus, playful fluctuations are felt in the course of Egyptian art. "This process is not as regular as that of classical art, and probably does not obey the same strict internal logic." It follows that art does not allow itself to be reduced to any formula, for if such a formula exists, it is sometimes applicable and sometimes seems impossible to apply, and precisely in those cases where, from the point of view of the specialist, we are talking about the most expressive and deeply distinctive features. From the point of view of the usefulness of the column, it can be said that external conditions very strictly limit the scope of architectural invention, imposing only certain basic ideas, themes that allow only minor changes. But beyond the valley, where all the schools crossed almost parallel paths, the winner and each of them went their own way, wandering in different directions. Although they were not completely independent, each of them began to listen to the voice of his own genius. From this period onwards, similarities are no longer found, but differences begin to appear. At such times, the influence of masters, past or present, begins to grow, bringing changes to domestic art.

The "capricious fluctuations" of Egyptian architecture can be explained in this way, and if the development of Greek architecture seems more linear, this may be an illusion. If we could cover the development of Greek art from the earliest times to the Byzantine era, instead of limiting ourselves to two or three centuries, it would be clear to everyone why the growing demand for tall columns, which Perron observed, began to decline after a certain period. The need for such a form is the result of the refined taste of the artists who created and nurtured this need, just as the builders who worked for generations on the banks of the Nile created there the habit of very large and solid buildings, making it general and constant, but it is impossible not to be influenced by other tastes (as happens when sometimes a more temperamental architect appears who tries to change it, rather than to correspond to the national spirit). But how much more they would benefit if these considerations were illustrated by examples from the higher spheres of art, such as painting, poetry and music!

## 2. Conclusion

Logical social similarity retains its significance in our time. Social networks, mass media and world culture further increase the similarity in people's behavior and thoughts. However, to maintain activity and develop critical thinking, a conscious and logical approach is necessary.

Logical social similarity plays an irreplaceable role both in individual development and in the harmonious functioning of society [2]. However, its balanced application ensures both the adaptation of a person to society and the preservation of his unique characteristics.

All this indicates that the problem under study has been extremely poorly studied. Therefore, for a more in-depth study of this problem, in addition to logical social similarity, it is also necessary to analyze the differences from a logical point of view, as well as comprehensively study the logical laws of imitation, the relationship between internal and external imitation and their consideration.

## Transparency:

The authors confirm that the manuscript is an honest, accurate, and transparent account of the study; that no vital features of the study have been omitted; and that any discrepancies from the study as planned have been explained. This study followed all ethical practices during writing.

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